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Regulating Disinformation in Europe:
Implications for Speech and Privacy
Joris van Hoboken* & Ronan Ó Fathaigh**
This Article examines the ongoing dynamics in the regulation of
disinformation in Europe, focusing on the intersection between the right to
freedom of expression and the right to privacy. Importantly, there has been
a recent wave of regulatory measures and other forms of pressure on online
platforms to tackle disinformation in Europe. These measures play out in
different ways at the intersection of the right to freedom of expression and
the right to privacy. Crucially, as governments, journalists, and researchers
seek greater transparency and access to information from online platforms
to evaluate their impact on the health of their democracies, these measures
raise acute issues related to user privacy. Indeed, platforms that once refused
to cooperate with governments in identifying users allegedly responsible for
disseminating illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation.
However, while platforms are increasingly facilitating government access to
user data, platforms are also invoking data protection law concerns as a
shield in response to recent efforts at increased platform transparency. At
the same time, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic
regulatory safeguards in Europe. It protects user autonomy concerning datadriven campaigns, requiring transparency for internet audiences about
targeting and data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as
social media companies.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a troubling wave of regulation sweeping across Europe
targeting disinformation on online platforms, with regulation further accelerating
during the Covid-19 pandemic.1 This regulation has not only taken the form of
legislation but has also encompassed other forms of government pressure on
platforms to combat disinformation. Indeed, platforms that once refused to
cooperate with European governments in identifying users responsible for
disseminating allegedly illegal or harmful content are now expanding cooperation.2
While these developments have profound implications for the right to freedom of
expression, there are also complicated implications for the rights to privacy and
protection of personal data. This is because greater transparency and access to
platform data are considered crucial tools in understanding disinformation and the
impact of social media on societies more generally.3 However, access to data raises
acute issues for user privacy, and indeed, platforms are invoking data protection law
concerns in response to recent efforts at increased transparency. Such concerns
notwithstanding, data protection law provides for one of the main systemic
1. See Council of Europe, Comm’r for Human Rights, Press Freedom Must Not Be
Undermined By Measures to Counter Disinformation About COVID-19 (2020), https://www.coe.
int/en/web/commissioner/-/press-freedom-must-not-be-undermined-by-measures-to-counterdisinf
ormation-about-covid-19 (criticizing measures taken in a number of European countries targeting
disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic); see also David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Disease Pandemics and
the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 23, 2020).
2. See Mathieu Rosemain, In a World First, Facebook to Give Data on Hate Speech Suspects to French
Courts, REUTERS (June 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-tech-exclusive/exclusive
-in-a-world-first-facebook-to-give-data-on-hate-speech-suspects-to-french-courts-idUSKCN1TQ1TJ;
see also Natasha Lomas, Germany Tightens Online Hate Speech Rules to Make Platforms Send Reports Straight to
the Feds, TECHCRUNCH (June 19, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightensonline-hate-speech-rules-to-make-platforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds.
3. See Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, A MultiDimensional Approach to Disinformation, at 22 (Mar. 2018) (arguing that “access to platforms’ data is
key to a better understanding the dissemination patterns of digital disinformation”).
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regulatory safeguards in Europe against data-driven manipulation, protecting user
autonomy in relation to data-driven campaigns, requiring transparency toward users
about targeting, and granting data subject rights in relation to online platforms.4
The purpose of this Article is to examine the implications of disinformation
regulation in the European Union on both the right to freedom of expression and
the right to privacy. In particular, the Article addresses the double-edged role
operated by European fundamental rights law. On the one hand, government
regulation of disinformation represents a danger to the exercise of freedom of
expression.5 On the other hand, under European freedom of expression principles,
the state has a positive obligation to create an enabling environment for freedom of
expression, including putting in place appropriate legal frameworks to allow a
plurality of voices.6 Similarly, disinformation regulation represents a danger to the
right to privacy and data protection (such as surveillance and monitoring of legal
content and online expressive and political activity). And yet, European data privacy
laws also offer a systemic safeguard for the protection of privacy and personal data.
This Article also discusses the implications of European disinformation
regulation and the consequent regulatory pressure being focused on the
responsibilities of dominant online platforms, almost all of which are not
headquartered in Europe.7 In this regard, while there are justified criticisms of
European disinformation policy, it must be recognized that this policy is quite
centrally about the impact these non-EU platforms have on the functioning of
European democracies and the responsiveness of these platforms to national laws
and conditions.8 As such, the Article situates European disinformation regulation
within the broader framework of transnational legal ordering, where European
disinformation regulation can be viewed as a transnational legal order (TLO),
comprised of a “collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations
and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across
national jurisdictions.”9 As described below, European disinformation regulation

4. For a study on data-subject access rights under EU data protection law, see Jef Ausloos &
Pierre Dewitte, Shattering One-Way Mirrors – Data Subject Access Rights In Practice, 8(1) INT’L DATA PRIV.
L. 4, (KU Leuven Centre For IT & IP Law, CiTiP Working Paper 32/2018, 2018).
5. Such as content-based restrictions on political expression.
6. See Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. v. Italy, App. No. 38433/09, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 339, 386–87.
7. Valentina Pop & Sam Schechner, Tech Giants to Face EU Legal Push on Content, Competition,
Taxes, WALL St. J. (July 5, 2020), www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-to-face-eu-legal-push-on-contentcompetition-taxes-11593967270.
8. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – On the European Democracy Action Plan, at 2, COM
(2020) 790 final (Mar. 12, 2020).
9. See TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, Transnational Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3, 5 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015); see also
GREGORY SHAFFER & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, With, Within, and Beyond the State: The Promise and Limits
of Transnational Legal Ordering, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Peer Zumbansen
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involves norms (a) formalized through hard and soft law, (b) produced by EU
member states and in conjunction with EU bodies and networks that transcend EU
nation-states, and (c) bodies (such as police) within multiple EU member states. All
the while, this TLO seeks to settle norms around disinformation across nation-state
boundaries in Europe and indeed beyond Europe.
Part I sets out the various forms that current disinformation regulation takes
and how such regulation squares with the right to freedom of expression. Part II
discusses the implications for the right to privacy, particularly related to police and
government access to data and the sharing of user data. Part III then assesses how
data protection law may provide a structural safeguard for protecting against the
excesses of data-driven disinformation.
I.

EUROPEAN DISINFORMATION LAW AND POLICY

The notion of disinformation is but the latest and more palatable offshoot of
the much-maligned notion of fake news.10 Following the widespread use of the term
by then-candidate Donald J. Trump in criticizing U.S. media during his 2016
presidential campaign, the term, unfortunately, migrated to Europe. Rather than
reject the use of such a term, some policymakers at the EU and national level not
only adopted the term but even began proposing legislation to restrict fake news.
For example, in early 2017, a bill was introduced in the Italian parliament proposing
to criminalize spreading “false, exaggerated, or biased” news reports online.11 Then,
in the summer of 2017, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on
the European Commission to analyze the legal framework on fake news and
consider the possibility of “legislative intervention” to limit the dissemination and
spreading of fake content.12
Fortunately, rather than rush to implement fake news legislation, an
independent high-level expert group (HLEG) was established by the European
ed. 2021); Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 231
(2016).
10. See Tarlach McGonagle, “Fake News”: False Fears or Real Concerns?, 35 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS.
203, 209 (2017) (arguing “accusations of peddling ‘fake news’ can stigmatize and undermine critical
media and erode public trust and confidence in the Fourth Estate.”); JORIS VAN HOBOKEN, NAOMI
APPELMAN, RONAN Ó FATHAIGH, PADDY LEERSSEN, TARLACH MCGONAGLE, NICO VAN EIJK, &
NATALI HELBERGER, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE DISSEMINATION OF DISINFORMATION
THROUGH INTERNET SERVICES AND THE REGULATION OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING 24 (2019)
(discussing how the term is “strongly associated with political and historical strategies to discredit
journalists”); Fernando Nuñez, Disinformation Legislation and Freedom of Expression, 10 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 783, 786 (2020) (arguing the term is “not helpful because it has been routinely used to describe
subjectively unfavorable content”).
11. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression), Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. OL ITA 1/2018, at p. 1 (Mar. 20, 2018).
12. Resolution on Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, EUR. PARL. DOC.
P8_TA(2017)0272 (2017).
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Commission, and it wholly rejected the use of the term “fake news,” as it was
“inadequate,” “misleading,” and appropriated by politicians to “undermine
independent news media.”13 This echoed a separate independent report drawn up
for the Council of Europe, which similarly argued against the use of the term due
to it being a “mechanism by which the powerful can clamp down upon, restrict,
undermine and circumvent the free press.”14 The Commission’s expert-group
report focused instead on the dangers of disinformation, which was defined as
“false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to
intentionally cause public harm or for profit.”15 The report stated that while
disinformation was not necessarily illegal, it can be “harmful for citizens and society
at large.”16 In particular, disinformation can threaten the integrity of European
media systems and political processes, and represents a special threat to the integrity
of elections.17
In the growing literature on disinformation, experts distinguish three
perspectives on disinformation that require attention: (1) the content perspective,
(2) the actor perspective, and (3) the manner of distribution perspective.18 First,
disinformation can be seen from the perspective of the actual content of
communications and publication. Something could be qualified as disinformation
because the content is false or misleading in particular ways. The content
perspective has been relatively dominant in regulatory discussions and public
debate. Second, disinformation can be seen with respect to the actors that are
behind particular communicative actions. Something could be qualified as
disinformation due to the particular involvement of (and potential deliberate
confusion about) specific manipulative actors, such as foreign state actors. Third,
something can be qualified as disinformation due to the way in which the
information is distributed, “encompass[ing] the variety of techniques viral deception
actors may use to enhance and exaggerate the reach, virality and impact of their
campaigns.”19 Notably, European scholars have begun attempting to measure the

13. Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, supra note
3, at 10.
14. CLAIRE WARDLE & HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, INFORMATION
DISORDER: TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH AND POLICY MAKING
16 (2017).
15. Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, supra note
3, at 13.
16. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 12.
18. See Camille François, Actors, Behaviors, Content: A Disinformation ABC Highlighting
Three Vectors of Viral Deception to Guide Industry & Regulatory Responses 2 (Sept. 20, 2019)
(Transatlantic High-Level Working Grp. on Content Moderation Online & Freedom of Expression,
Working Paper).
19. Id. at 4.
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actual effects on political attitudes of certain forms and techniques of disseminating
manipulated content, such as manipulated political videos known as “deepfakes.”20
Notably, the report of the high-level expert group created by the Commission
focused on the role of online platforms and how they facilitate the production and
circulation of disinformation in new ways and on vast scales. The report singled out
the data-driven services and mechanisms offered by platforms that are said to be
harnessed by those engaging in disinformation, namely: “behavioral data collection,
analytics, advertising exchanges, tools for cluster detection and tracking social media
sentiment, and various forms of AI/machine learning.”21 Crucially, the report
recommended against “[a]ny form of censorship either public or private,”22 but
delivered a range of recommendations to tackle disinformation based on five pillars:
(1) enhance the transparency of the digital information ecosystem, (2) promote the
use of media and information literacy to counter disinformation, (3) develop tools
for empowering users and journalists and foster a positive engagement with fastevolving information technologies, (4) safeguard the diversity and sustainability of
the European news media ecosystem, and (5) conduct continuous research on the
impact of disinformation in Europe.23
Following the report, the European Commission adopted an influential
Communication in 2018, entitled Tackling online disinformation: a European approach,
which omitted the use of the term fake news and instead focused on
disinformation.24 The Commission defined disinformation as “verifiably false or
misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic
gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm.”25 The
Commission did not provide a reference for this definition, but as we and others
have noted, it bears a striking resemblance to a number of so-called false news laws
that have been found by national supreme courts to violate freedom of expression
standards.26 Significantly, the Commission decided against any form of legislative
proposal on disinformation, and instead it took the following approach.
In October 2018, the Commission unveiled the EU Code of Practice on
Disinformation, which had been agreed to by several online platforms (Facebook,
Google, Twitter, Mozilla, and more recently, Microsoft and TikTok) and advertising
20. See Tom Dobber, Nadia Metoui, Damian Trilling, Natali Helberger & Claes de Vreese, Do
(Microtargeted) Deepfakes Have Real Effects on Political Attitudes?, INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 1 (2020), https://doi.
org/10.1177/1940161220944364.
21. Commission’s High Level Expert Group’s Report on Fake News and Online Disinformation, at 22
(Mar. 12, 2018), http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50271.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Id. at 5–6.
24. Commission Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, COM(2018)
236 final (Mar. 12, 2018).
25. Id. at 3–4.
26. VAN HOBOKEN ET. AL, supra note 10, at 41 (giving examples from the Supreme Court of
Canada, Supreme Court, of Zimbabwe and Supreme Court of Uganda).
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industry associations.27 The Code was designed to commit online platforms and the
advertising industry to a number of objectives set out in five pillars: (1) improve the
scrutiny of advertisement placements, in order to reduce revenues of the purveyors
of disinformation; (2) increase the transparency of political advertising and issuebased advertising; (3) ensure the integrity of services with regard to accounts whose
purpose and intent is to spread disinformation; (4) empower consumers by diluting
the visibility of disinformation, improving findability of trustworthy content, and
provide users with easily-accessible tools to report disinformation; and (5) empower
the research community by providing access to (a) privacy-compliant data for factchecking and research activities, (b) relevant data on the functioning of their
services, and (c) general information on algorithms.28
In the process leading to the presentation of the Code, a Sounding Board—
established by the European Commission to assess the Code—gave a damning
opinion. The Sounding Board stated in no uncertain terms that the “so-called” code
of practice was not a code of practice and “by no means self-regulation,” as it had
“no clear and meaningful commitments, no measurable objectives or [key
performance indicators],” and thus, “no possibility to monitor process, and no
compliance or enforcement tool.”29
In December 2020, the newly appointed European Commission published its
proposed reforms of the EU legislative framework applying to online platforms,
known as the Digital Services Act (DSA).30 The proposed DSA imposes a range of
new obligations on certain large platforms, including transparency obligations
relating to content moderation systems,31 recommender systems,32 online
advertising,33 and independent audits.34 Crucially, certain large platforms will be
required to manage “systemic risks” stemming from the functioning and use of their
service in the EU, such as the dissemination of illegal content and “intentional
manipulation of their service.”35 These systematic risks may also take the form of
“coordinated operations aimed at amplifying information, including disinformation,
such as the use of bots or fake accounts for the creation of fake or misleading

27. Preamble, EU CODE OF PRACTICE ON DISINFORMATION (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation [hereinafter EU CODE OF PRACTICE].
28. Id. § IIA–IIB.
29. Sounding Bd. of the Multi-Stakeholder Forum on the Code of Practice, The Sounding Board’s
Unanimous Final Opinion on the So-Called Code of Practice (Sept. 24, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/
dae/document.cfm?doc_id=54456.
30. See Regulation of the European Parliament an of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services
(Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
31. Id. at 50.
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 31.
34. Id. at 61.
35. Id. at 59–60.
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information.”36 Further, in order to “facilitate supervision and research” in relation
to disinformation,37 certain large platforms will be required to make publicly
available repositories of online advertising displayed on their platforms.38
A. Transparency and Access to Platform Data
A major European policy objective for tackling disinformation, and indeed
other problems associated with platforms, is greater transparency of platform
ecosystems and access to platform data.39 These have been advocated by expert
groups, academia, civil society, journalists, and regulators. For example, the HighLevel Expert Group on disinformation emphasized that access to platform data was
“key to a [sic] better understanding the dissemination patterns of digital
disinformation,”40 to understanding scale and scope of disinformation problems,
and, crucially, to allowing proper evaluation of the efficiency of responses.41 In
particular, the Expert Group recommended that platforms should “enable privacycompliant access to data for the identification of online disinformation actors, for
the assessment of fact-checking and debunking strategies and for the study of
disinformation dynamics by academics.”42 A prominent role for academic research
was also highlighted. The Expert Group recommended that platforms provide data
on the “functioning of their services including data for independent investigation
by academic researchers and general information on algorithms in order to find a
common approach to address the dissemination and amplification of
disinformation.”43
As mentioned above, the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation has a
specific pillar dedicated to access to platform data, with platforms committing to
“support good faith independent efforts to track disinformation and understand its
impact.” This commitment includes “sharing privacy protected datasets” and not
prohibiting or discouraging good faith research into disinformation and political
advertising on their platforms.”44 The European Regulators Group for Audiovisual
Media Service (ERGA), which comprises the heads of national audiovisual
regulators from each EU member state, was tasked with monitoring the
36. Id. at 84.
37. Id. at 82–83.
38. Id. at 62.
39. For a discussion of current sources of information on platforms’ content moderation, see
Daphne Keller & Paddy Leerssen, Facts and Where to Find Them: Empirical Research on Internet Platforms and
Content Moderation, in SOCIAL MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY: THE STATE OF THE FIELD AND PROSPECTS
FOR REFORM 220-51 (Nathaniel Persily & Joshua A. Tucker eds., 2020).
40. Rep. of the Indep. High Level Grp. on Fake News and Online Disinformation, supra note
3, at 22.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Id. at 33.
44. EU CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 27, § II.E.
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implementation of the Code of Practice.45 ERGA published a report in June 2020
on the implementation of the Code’s data access commitments, which contains
considerable criticism of platforms’ progress with providing access to data.46
The ERGA report stated that there were “enormous difficulties” for
researchers to get access to data. Platforms do not share “crucial data points,
including data on ad targeting and user engagement with disinformation,” and the
most important questions about the extent and impact of disinformation “remain
unanswered.”47 The report does mention that in 2018, Facebook launched Social
Science One as an “ad hoc program aimed at partnering with academics and sharing
privacy protected datasets.”48 However, in late 2019, the Co-Chairs and European
Advisory Committee of Social Science One published a statement expressing
frustration, as “Facebook has still not provided academics with anything
approaching adequate data access.”49 The statement strongly articulated that the
“current situation is untenable,” as “[h]eated public and political discussions are
waged over the role and responsibilities of platforms in today’s societies, and yet
researchers cannot make fully informed contributions to these discussions” and
“are mostly left in the dark, lacking appropriate data to assess potential risks and
benefits.”50
ERGA has recommended that platforms be required to share data for research
purposes,51 and indeed, the EU’s proposed DSA contains substantive new rules on
access to data.52 An important part of the proposal is the creation of new, dedicated
national regulatory bodies (Digital Services Coordinators), which would be
empowered to employ large online platforms to access data that are necessary to
monitor and assess compliance with the proposed legislation.53

45. Commission and High Representative Joint Communication on the Action Plan Against Disinformation,
JOIN (2018) 36 final, 9 (May 12, 2018) (“The Commission will, with the help of the European
Regulators Group for Audio-visual Media Services (ERGA) monitor the implementation of the
commitments by the signatories of the Code of Practice.”).
46. See Eur. Reguls. Grp. for Audiovisual Media Servs. (ERGA), ERGA Rep. on Disinformation:
Assessment of the Implementation of the Code of Practice (2020), https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads
/2020/05/ERGA-2019-report-published-2020-LQ.pdf.
47. Id. at 38.
48. Id. at 35. See SOCIAL SCIENCE ONE, https://socialscience.one (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
49. Public Statement From the Co-Chairs and European Advisory Committee of Social Science One, SOCIAL
SCIENCE ONE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://socialscience.one/blog/public-statement-european-advisorycommittee-social-science-one.
50. Id.
51. Eur. Reguls. Grp. for Audiovisual Media Servs. (ERGA), supra note 46, at 40.
52. See Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services
(Digital Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 30, at 62–63.
53. Id.
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B. Content-Based Restrictions on Disinformation
Up to this point in the discussion, the whole premise of EU policy on
disinformation has been that disinformation is not per se illegal, but it is harmful,
and the Commission has always distinguished between illegal content (such as child
abuse material) and harmful content (such as disinformation).54 However, there is
a growing realization that disinformation may already be or may become prohibited
and criminalized in a number of EU member states, with more seeking to do so
during the Covid-19 pandemic.55 Thus, there is an acute danger of European and
national policy-makers focusing on a notion where there already exist very broad
and vague laws open to particular abuse.
One of the most notable national laws containing content-based restrictions
on disinformation was France’s 2018 law on the fight against the manipulation of
information.56 The law provides that during the three months prior to an election,
a court can order an online platform to remove “inaccurate or misleading allegations
or imputations of fact,” which may “alter the sincerity of an upcoming vote” and
are “disseminated deliberately, artificially or automatedly,” and on a massive scale.57
The court is required to deliver a decision within forty-eight hours, and any appeal
decision must be delivered within forty-eight hours.58 However, what is rarely
discussed is that France has criminalized publication of “false news” under its
Freedom of the Press Law 1881 for many years,59 while Article 97 of the Electoral
Code makes it a criminal offence to spread “false news” with the effect of distorting
the outcome of an election.60 Indeed, François Fillon, the former Prime Minister of
France who was recently convicted of embezzling public funds,61 used this false
news provision to file a criminal complaint against the newspaper that originally
published the allegations against him during the 2017 presidential elections.62
24.

54.

See Commission Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, supra note

55. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Tacking COVID-19 Disinformation – Getting
the Facts Right, JOIN (2020) 8 final (June 10, 2020).
56. Loi 2018-1202 du 22 décembre 2018 relative à la lutte contre la manipulation de
l'information [Law 2018-1202 of December 22, 2018 on the fight against the manipulation of
information], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
FRANCE].
57. Id.
58. Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse [Law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the
press], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
art. 27.
59. Id.
60. Code électoral [Electoral Code] art. L97.
61. Aurelien Breeden, François Fillon, Ex-Presidential Hopeful in France, Is Convicted of Embezzlement,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2020, at A10.
62. Saim Saeed, François Fillon Claims Le Canard Enchainé Illegally Influenced French Election,
POLITICO (May 3, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/francois-fillon-claims-le-canard-enchaineillegally-influenced-french-election.
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France is not alone in its content-based restrictions, and similar provisions
exist in a number of other EU member states. First, Malta’s Criminal Code
criminalizes spreading false news, which is defined as “maliciously spreading false
news which is likely to alarm public opinion or disturb public good order or the
public peace or to create a commotion among the public or among certain classes
of the public.”63 Second, Lithuania’s Law on the Provision of Information to the
Public prohibits the dissemination of disinformation, which is defined as
“intentionally disseminated false information.”64 Third, section 264 of Austria’s
Criminal Code also criminalizes the dissemination of false news during an election
or referendum.65 Fourth, under Article 191 of Greece’s Criminal Code, “causing
fear” by disseminating false news via the Internet is a criminal offence.66 Fifth,
under Poland’s Local Elections Act, a court may issue an order restraining the
publication of “untrue data or information” about an election candidate.67
There have also been a number of content-based restrictions enacted more
recently during the Covid-19 pandemic targeting the notion of disinformation. For
example, Romania’s 2020 Presidential Decree permitted the communications
regulator to order the removal of and block access to online content that “promotes
false news” regarding Covid-19 protection and prevention measures.68 Similarly,
Hungary enacted Act XII of 2020 on containment of coronavirus, which amended
the Criminal Code’s definition of “scaremongering” to include the dissemination of
“any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact with regard to the public danger
that is capable of causing disturbance or unrest in a larger group of persons at the
63. CRIMINAL CODE, ART. 82 (amended by the Media and Defamation Act, 2018).
64. Law on the Provision of Information to the Public, No I-1418, art. 2(13) (1996), amended by
No XII-2239 of Dec. 23 2015.
65. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] § 264 [Verbreitung falscher Nachrichten bei einer
Wahl oder Volksabstimmung] [Dissemination of false news in an election or referendum] (Austria); see
Dr. Walter Berka & Dr. Josef Trappel, Internet Freedom in Austria: A Survey Based on the
Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to the
Member States Regarding Internet Freedom 31 (Jan. 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://rm.coe.int/report-of-austria-to-the-council-of-europe-following-recommendation-cm/16808
c6194 (“[D]istribution of false rumours and manipulated news on the Internet violates existing
legislation only in exceptional cases, such as when false news is distributed during an election period or
referendum (sec. 264 StGB).”).
66. POINIKOS KODIKAS [P.K] [CRIMINAL CODE] 4619:191 (Greece).
67. Ordynacja wyborcza do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw [Law of 16 July
1998 on Elections to Municipalities, District Councils and Regional Assemblies] (Dz.U. 1998 Nr 95
poz. 602) § 72.
68. Decret semnat de Președintele României, domnul Klaus Iohannis, privind instituirea stării
de urgență pe teritoriul României, 16 martie 2020 [Decree Signed by the President of Romania, Mr.
Klaus Iohannis, Regarding the Establishment of the State of Emergency on the Romanian Territory,
Mar. 16, 2020] art. 54, https://www.presidency.ro/ro/media/decret-semnat-de-presedintele-romanieidomnul-klaus-iohannis-privind-instituirea-starii-de-urgenta-pe-teritoriul-romaniei; see COVID-19:
Restrictions on Access to Information in Romania, EUR. FED’N JOURNALISTS (Mar. 29, 2020),
https://europeanjournalists.org/blog/2020/03/29/covid-19-restrictions-on-access-to-information-in
-romania/.
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site of public danger” or “any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact that is
capable of hindering or preventing the efficiency of protection.”69 Further, Bulgaria
also adopted draft legislation criminalizing the spread of “internet misinformation”
and granted the media regulator the power to suspend websites for distributing
misinformation.70 These are all national legislative measures adopted by EU
member states that are content-based restrictions applying to the notion of online
disinformation.
C. Law Enforcement Involvement
While European policy does not treat disinformation as illegal content, a
particular feature of European practice on disinformation is the involvement of law
enforcement. A concerning example from a freedom of expression perspective can
be found in Italy where, in the run-up to the 2018 elections, the Ministry of the
Interior implemented an online reporting service known as the Red Button
Protocol. Under this Protocol users could “indicate the existence of a network of
content attributable to fake news.”71 Notably, the Polizia Postale, a police unit that
investigates online crime, was responsible for reviewing reports. After reviewing the
information, the police could pursue legal action if it determined that the content is
unlawful.72 The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression was particularly
critical of this mechanism, expressing concern that under international standards of
freedom of expression the restrictions established by the Protocol were
“inconsistent with the criteria of legality, necessity and proportionality.”73 In
particular, the Protocol could have a particularly strong “chilling effect” on the
exercise of the right to freedom of expression as the Protocol could function as a
“pipeline” for criminal prosecutions.74
Similarly, in the run-up to the 2018 elections in Spain, the Ministry of the
Interior announced that teams of police officers would trawl the internet for signs
of fake news and “keep a particularly close eye” on social media platforms as part

69. 2020. évi XII (Act XII of 2020 on the containment of coronavirus), at § 10(2), amending
the Criminal Code, § 337 (“Scaremongering”) (Hung.); see Gábor Polyák, “Enabling Act” in Hungary:
Uncontrolled Government Power, Threatened Press, INTERNET POL’Y REV. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://policyrevie
w.info/articles/news/enabling-act-hungary-uncontrolled-government-power-threatened-press/1466.
70. See Press Release, Org. for Sec. & Coop. in Europe (OSCE), COVID-19 Response in
Bulgaria Should Not Curb Media Freedom, Says OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (Apr.
15, 2020), https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/450193.
71. Kaye, supra note 11, at 1; see also Angela Giuffrida, Italians Asked to Report Fake News to
Police in Run-up to Election, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan
/19/italians-asked-report-fake-news-police-run-up-election.
72. Kaye, supra note 11, at 2.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id.
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of the election security plan.75 During the Covid-19 pandemic, free speech
organizations such as Article 19 have criticized Spanish police involvement in
targeting individuals suspected of spreading disinformation.76 In February 2020,
Spanish prosecutors initiated the first lawsuit for spreading fake news and publicly
identified the woman involved.77 Similarly, in Hungary, the police have arrested
individuals on suspicion of spreading fake news.78 In the Netherlands, law
enforcement agencies have posted videos on Facebook warning about the dangers
of fake news.79
Further, elected officials seek to publicize the involvement of law
enforcement where disinformation is concerned. For example, in November 2018,
a Member of the European Parliament publicized a complaint submitted to
Portuguese police, Belgian police, and Europol regarding a “fake news” website.
The Member requested that Europol investigate the website, identify who was
behind it, and “demand the removal of all defamatory content.”80 In Spain,
members of parliament have also filed a number of criminal complaints against
individuals for sharing hoaxes about the government’s response to the pandemic.
These complaints cite laws criminalizing “calumny” and “insult” to state institutions
under the Spanish Penal Code.81 It is unclear whether fake news and disinformation
are criminal offences and, moreover, whether the involvement of law enforcement
is an appropriate remedy.
D. Pseudo-Militarization of Disinformation Policy
A further concerning pillar of European disinformation policy that has
emerged is the involvement of the foreign policy arms of the EU and its member
75. Spanish Police to Watch Web for Fake News Before Vote, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-politics-news/spanish-police-to-watch-web-for-fake-newsbefore-vote-idUSL8N2123OP.
76. Spain: Concerns as Penal Code Used to Criminalise Jokes and Misinformation About Coronavirus,
ARTICLE 19 (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.article19.org/resources/spain-penal-code-used-to-criminali
se-jokes-and-misinformation-about-coronavirus/.
77. Id.; see also AFP, Spanish Prosecutors File Pioneering Lawsuit Against 'Fake News', LOCAL: SPAIN
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.thelocal.es/20200228/spanish-prosecutors-file-first-lawsuit-againstfake-news.
78. See Justin Spike, He Criticized the Government on Facebook, and Was Taken From His Home by
Police at Dawn, INSIGHTHUNGARY (May 12, 2020), https://insighthungary.444.hu/2020/05/12/hecriticized -the-government-on-facebook-and-was-taken-from-his-home-by-police-at-dawn.
79. See Politie Amsterdam, Voorkom verspreiding van nepnieuws: denk voor je deelt [Prevent the Spread of
Fake News: Think Before Sharing], FACEBOOK (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2
14686616405935.
80. Letter from Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament, to Catherine De Bolle,
Executive Director of Europol (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.anagomes.eu/PublicDocs/25b1d52c715a-42da-b3fa-920d499ad5a6.pdf; see also Rosianne Cutajar Reacts to Criminal Complaint by Gomes Over
Online Article, TIMES MALTA (Nov. 28, 2018).
81. Spain: Concerns as Penal Code Used to Criminalise Jokes and Misinformation About Coronavirus, supra
note 76.
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states stimulated by the pseudo-militarization of disinformation policy. Most
striking is the language being used in relation to disinformation, which is generally
framed around conflict, combat, weapons, and defense. Josep Borrell, the EU’s
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has
spoken of how disinformation “can kill,” and in today’s society, “warriors wield
keyboards rather than swords” with disinformation campaigns being a recognized
“weapon” that the EU must “fight.”82 This foreign policy aspect of disinformation
is built upon a number of efforts based on data and information sharing and the
monitoring of the online environment.83
First, the EU established the EU Rapid Alert System (RAS) on
disinformation. The RAS is a “secure digital platform” and “dedicated technological
infrastructure,” where EU member states and EU institutions can issue alerts on
disinformation and facilitate “sharing of data and assessments.”84 Each EU member
state is required to designate a contact point, and platforms must “cooperate with
the contact points underpinning the Rapid Alert System, in particular during
election periods.”85 There is little transparency about the operation of the RAS.
Governments have neither disclosed what content, data, and information are being
shared nor how the platforms have responded. But a report published after the 2019
European Parliament elections stated that there had been “daily exchanges and
sharing of information,” and, indeed, the RAS had “strengthened cooperation with
platforms, although the platforms still need to become more responsive to external
reports.”86 Notably, the RAS has facilitated cooperation with NATO and will be
“further strengthened in the future.”87 Indeed, EU officials have stated how during
the Covid-19 pandemic, “we need to continue to work with the platforms, to ask
to remove a lot of messages,” but “we need to think about a regulation because we
don’t have for the moment the capacity to go further than that.”88
Second, disinformation is now considered by the EU to be what is called a
hybrid threat, alongside radicalization and violent extremism.89 For this reason, the
EU Hybrid Fusion Cell was established within the EU Intelligence and Situation
Centre of the EU’s European External Action Service to monitor and address
82. European Commission Press Release IP/20/1006, Coronavirus: EU Strengthens Action to
Tackle Disinformation (June 10, 2020).
83. Action Plan Against Disinformation, supra note 35, at 5–8.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id.
86. Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation, at 3, JOIN(2019)12 final
(June 14, 2019).
87. Id. at 3–4.
88. See Samuel Stolton, Regulation Against Fake News ‘Very Important,’ Reynders Says, EURACTIV
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/regulation-against-fake-news-veryimportant-reynders-says.
89. Increasing Resilience and Bolstering Capabilities to Address Hybrid Threats, at 3, JOIN(2018)16 final
(June 13, 2018).
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hybrid threats by foreign actors, including disinformation.90 Notably, in 2018,
expert staff were added to engage in “data mining and analysis to process the
relevant data;” to provide “additional media monitoring services to cover a wider
range of sources and languages;” and to invest in “analytical tools,” such as
“dedicated software to mine, organise and aggregate vast amounts of digital data.”91
Third, the European Council established the East Stratcom Task Force, also
within the European External Action Service, to engage in “tracking and tackling
disinformation.”92 According to the EU, this monitoring has resulted in over 6,500
individual disinformation cases, many of which deliberately target Europe.”93 This
has been done through a service called EUvsDisinfo run by the East Stratcom Task
Force. By using “data analysis and media monitoring services,” EUvsDisinfo
“identifies, compiles, and exposes disinformation cases.”94 However, EUvsDisinfo
has faced criticism. Three Dutch news outlets initiated legal proceedings for their
inclusion on the disinformation repository after various news articles they had
published were publicly classified as disinformation.95 A few days before the court
hearing, the articles were removed from the repository and a correction was
included.
E. Implications for Freedom of Expression
The current path being taken by European governments to regulate
disinformation has profound implications on freedom of expression. First, under
international human rights standards, the four special international mandates on
freedom of expression have been quite forthright that “[g]eneral prohibitions on
the dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including
‘false news’ or ‘non-objective information,’ are incompatible with international

90. Commission Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, supra note
24, at 16.
91. Commission and High Representative Joint Communication on the Action Plan against Disinformation,
supra note 45, at 5.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id.
94. See EUvsDisinfo: Disinformation Operations About COVID-19, EU OPEN DATA PORTAL (Apr.
6, 2020), https://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/euvsdisinfo-disinformation-operations-abou
t-covid-19.
95. See Michael Peel, Mehreen Khan, & Max Seddon, EU Attack on Pro-Kremlin ‘Fake News’
Takes a Hit, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5ec2a204-3406-11e8-ae84494103e73f 7f; Cent. Eur. News, Three Dutch Media Outlets to Take the EU to Court in 'Misinformation' Spat,
PRESS GAZETTE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/three-dutch-media-outlets-to-takethe-eu-court-in-misinformation-spat/; Emiel Jurjens & Jens van den Brink, Recent Experience Shows EU
Measures Against Fake News Are Problematic, MEDIA REP. (May 15, 2018), http://www.mediareport.nl/en
/press-law/15052018/recent-experience-shows-eu-measures-against-fake-news-are-problematic/.
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standards for restrictions on freedom of expression,” and “should be abolished.”96
Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has stated that
disinformation is an “extraordinarily elusive concept to define in law” and is
“susceptible to providing executive authorities with excessive discretion to
determine what is disinformation, what is a mistake, what is truth.”97 As such, the
“penalization of disinformation is disproportionate” and results in “deterring
individuals from sharing what could be valuable information.”98 Unfortunately,
some EU member states, as described above, are enacting and have existing laws
on disinformation, false information, and false news, which are difficult to reconcile
with international freedom of expression standards.
With respect to the proper legal standard for regulation of disinformation in
Europe, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a number of
judgments on false information legislation that are instructive. The Court has
delivered three unanimous judgments concerning a provision under Polish election
legislation, which allows election candidates to apply to a regional court for an order
restraining publication of campaign material or statements containing “untrue data
or information,” with the court required to examine the application “within 24
hours.”99 Notably, the ECtHR has found in all three judgments, including in a 2019
judgment, that various proceedings under this provision violated Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).100 For instance, in Brzeziński v.
Poland, the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 10 because domestic
courts had “immediately classified as lies” statements made by a local politician
during an election, and “[b]y following such an approach the domestic courts
effectively deprived [the politician] of the protection afforded by Article 10.”101
Further, in Kwiecień v. Poland, the Court found serious deficiencies under proceedings
for “untrue information” during an election and even held that the “fairness of the
proceedings may be called into question.”102 Similarly, in Kita v. Poland, the Court
unanimously found a violation of Article 10 over “untrue information” proceedings,
holding that the courts “unreservedly qualified all of [the statements] as statements
which lacked any factual basis,” and the “standards applied” by the courts were “not
compatible with the principles embodied in Article 10.”103 In general, these cases
96. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and
Propaganda, FOM.GAL/3/17, (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/8/30279
6.pdf.
97. Kaye, supra note 1, at 13.
98. Id.
99. See Brzeziński v. Poland, App. No. 47542/07 at 7 (2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=
001-194958.
100. See id.; Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99 (2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=0
01-78876; Kita v. Poland, App. No. 57659/00 (2008), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87424.
101. Brzeziński, App. No. 47542/07 at 13.
102. Kwiecień, App. No. 57659/00 at 18.
103. Kita, App. No. 57659/00 at 11.
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demonstrate that there are serious questions about the compatibility of legislation
that seeks to target false information, but does not allow for examination of whether
there has actually been undue harm to reputation or candidates’ personality rights.
The government-platform initiatives also warrant close scrutiny. The human
rights group Article 19 has expressed its concern over EU disinformation policy as
it is “plac[ing] increasing pressure on tech companies to monitor and remove
content on their platforms,” and during the pandemic, platforms “rely more on
automated content takedowns, with a reduced and remote workforce.”104 We must
remember that this is all happening outside of a clear legal framework and may
involve information that is perfectly legal, but considered objectionable by EU and
national governmental officials. Damian Tambini has argued how vague and
subjective the notion of disinformation is, which can include content that is legal,
but “subjectively undesirable.”105 Thus, public officials have great latitude in the
type of content that may be labelled disinformation and may end up targeting
expression (however objectionable) that clearly constitutes expression on matters
of public interest. These types of government-platform initiatives, which operate
outside a legislative footing, raise acute issues for freedom of expression and
accountability. Similar systems involving government-platform cooperation are the
EU’s code of practice on hate speech, the EU Internet Forum, the EU Crisis
Protocol, and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), which
has been criticized by a range of NGOs due to the “risks involved in content
removal coordination among companies.”106
II.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION

The regulation of disinformation also has distinct implications for the right to
privacy and protection of personal data. This is because disinformation regulation
and policy are resulting in increased monitoring and surveillance of the online
environment and increased access to user data from platforms. As the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights has stated, government monitoring of
information that is publicly available about a person, such as social media posts,
undoubtedly implicates the right to privacy.107

104. EU Communication on Tackling Coronavirus Disinformation, ARTICLE 19 (June 11, 2020),
https://www.article19.org/resources/europe-eu-communication-on-tackling-coronavirus-disinformat
ion/.
105. See DAMIAN TAMBINI, MEDIA FREEDOM, REGULATION AND TRUST: A SYSTEMIC
APPROACH TO INFORMATION DISORDER 21 (2020), https://rm.coe.int/cyprus-2020-new-media/
16809a524f.
106. Access Now, et al., Joint Letter to New Executive Director, Global Internet Forum to Counter
Terrorism, Hum. Rts. Watch (July 30, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/30/jointletter-new-executive-director-global-internet-forum-counter-terrorism.
107. U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/29, ¶ 6 (Aug. 3, 2018).
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A. Online Monitoring and Disinformation
As described above, there is a whole array of EU and national agencies now
engaged in monitoring the online environment in some form. Police forces in
various EU member states are engaged in monitoring online discussions in order to
identify disinformation and make arrests.108 Both Europol and Interpol have
detailed reports on the activities of national law enforcement in monitoring the
online environment for disinformation.109 Although transparency is generally
considered positive, it may be problematic when law enforcement agencies
constantly remind individuals that they are monitoring and surveilling the online
environment. In Hungary, police officers arrested individuals who posted online
comments on the government’s response to Covid-19. The police officers filmed
and posted search-and-seizure and arrest videos to the national police force’s
YouTube channel.110 The police also released statements reiterating that its
cybercrime unit “continuously monitors the content related to the infection on the
Internet.”111
A report on online disinformation written for the French Ministry for Europe
and Foreign Affairs and Ministry for the Armed Forces included a recommendation
of increased surveillance of “risk communities,” such as “extremist, conspiratorial
and religious groups,” in order to “better grasp the communities that propagate
false information on the social networks.”112 Once accounts are identified,
authorities should engage in “naming and shaming” by naming the source and
“discredit[ing] the content of the fake news story—either directly, in an official
manner, or indirectly.”113
108. For the situation outside of the EU, see Mu Sochua, Coronavirus ‘Fake News’ Arrests Are
Quieting Critics, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 22, 2020, 9:23 AM), https://foreigsnpolicy.com/2020/05/22/co
ronavirus-fake-news-arrests-quiet-critics-southeast-asia/.
109. See Interpol Report Shows Alarming Rate of Cyberattacks During COVID-19, INTERPOL (Aug. 4,
2020), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/INTERPOL-report-shows-alar
ming-rate-of-cyberattacks-during-COVID-19; EUROPOL, CATCHING THE VIRUS: CYBERCRIME,
DISINFORMATION AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020), https://www.europol.europa.eu/publicat
ions-documents/catching-virus-cybercrime-disinformation-and-covid-19-pandemic.
110. Alasdair Sandford, Hungary: ‘Critics Silenced’ in Social Media Arrests as EU Debates Orban’s
Powers, EURONEWS (May 15, 2020), https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/14/hungary-criticssilenced-in-social-media-arrests-as-eu-debates-orban-s-powers; Andras Gergely & Veronika Gulyas,
Orban Uses Crisis Powers for Detentions Under ‘Fake News’ Law, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-13/orban-uses-crisis-powers-for-detentionsunder-fake-news-law; ORFK Communication Service, Not Only Did He “Produce,” He Also Spread The
Horror News (Mar. 15, 2020, 13:55), http://www.police.hu/hu/hirek-es-informaciok/legfrissebbhireink/bunugyek/nemcsak-gyartotta-terjesztette-is-a-remhirt (video uploaded by the Hungarian
National Police Communication Service, showing arrest of suspect for spreading false rumors).
111. Id.
112. JEAN-BAPTISTE JEANGÈNE VILMER, ALEXANDRE ESCORCIA, MARINE GUILLAUME &
JANAINA HERRERA, INFORMATION MANIPULATION: A CHALLENGE FOR OUR DEMOCRACIES
(2018), https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/information_manipulation_rvb_cle838736.pdf.
113. Id. at 173.
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Under European human rights law, these surveillance measures may impinge
on the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. The ECtHR has considered
whether police violate a person’s right to private life when they gather and retain
information on a person’s expressive public activity that is not illegal but may be
concerning to authorities. In the 2019 judgment of Catt v. the United Kingdom,114 an
anti-war activist discovered he was included on a police extremism database, which
documented information gathered by police about his presence at perfectly lawful
protests. Following police refusal to delete the information from the database, the
European Court ultimately found a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court
was particularly critical of the police gathering of information based on the term
“domestic extremism,” which is not prescribed by law and which had a variety of
working definitions.115 The Court held that the police decision to “retain the
applicant’s personal data did not take into account the heightened level of
protection it attracted as data revealing a political opinion, and that in the
circumstances its retention must have had a ‘chilling effect.’”116 The Court
reiterated that personal data “revealing political opinions attracts a heightened level
of protection.” It noted that there is “significant ambiguity over the criteria being
used by the police to govern the collection of the data in question” and that
“perhaps as a result, the database in issue appears to have been assembled on a
somewhat ad hoc basis.”117
Disinformation is similarly an ambiguous notion, which is in many instances
not prescribed by law, and the ECtHR has long held that the “mere storing of
information” on a person by the authorities amounts to an interference with the
right to private life.118
B. Government Access to User Data
While access to platform data is advocated as an important tool to understand
the distribution of disinformation, such access to user data could carry serious risks
to user privacy. Specific attention is warranted for the inclusion of access-to-data
provisions in new laws targeting disinformation. This issue raised its head during
the passage of laws such as Germany’s Network Enforcement Act in 2017119 and
France’s Law on combatting the manipulation of information.

114. Catt v. United Kingdom, App. No. 43514/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2019), http://hudoc.echr.coe
.int/eng?i=001-189424.
115. Id. ¶ 97.
116. Id. ¶ 123.
117. Id. ¶ 97.
118. Id. ¶ 93.
119. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in
Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act)], Oct. 1, 2017 (Ger.), https://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs
/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
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We turn first to Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was enacted,
according to the German government, in order to not only tackle hate speech but
the “spread of ‘fake news.’”120 The Act operates as follows: section 3(1) places an
obligation on platforms to maintain an “effective and transparent procedure for
handling complaints about unlawful content” and must “supply users with an easily
recognisable, directly accessible and permanently available procedure for submitting
complaints about unlawful content.”121 Unlawful content is defined as content
criminalized under twenty-two criminal offences under the German Criminal Code.
Section 3(2) then sets out how platforms must operate their procedures for handling
reports of unlawful content. First, platforms must take “immediate note” of any
complaint and check “whether the content reported in the complaint is unlawful
and subject to removal or whether access to the content must be blocked.”122
Second, and crucially, platforms must remove or block access to “content that is
manifestly unlawful within 24 hours of receiving the complaint.”123 The Act does
not define “manifestly unlawful.”
While these provisions raise freedom of expression concerns, certain
additional provisions raise right to privacy concerns.124 The UN Special Rapporteur
on freedom of expression raised right to privacy concerns during the passage of the
Act. First, there was concern over the provision that mandated “storage and
documentation of data concerning violative content and user information related to
such content, especially since the judiciary can order that data be revealed.”125 The

120. See Letter from the Federal Government of Germany to the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression (June 1, 2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/GermanyReply9Aug2017.pdf; see
also Amélie Heldt, Reading Between the Lines and the Numbers: An Analysis of the First NetzDG Reports, 8(2)
INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1 (2019); Rebecca Zipursky, Nuts About Netz: The Network Enforcement Act and
Freedom of Expression, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1325 (2019); Heidi Tworek & Paddy Leerssen, An
Analysis of Germany’s NetzDG Law (Transatlantic High Level Working Grp. on Content Moderation
Online & Freedom of Expression, Working Paper, 2019).
121. Access Now, supra note 106.
122. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in
Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act)], Oct. 1, 2017, § 3(2) (Ger.).
123. Id.
124. See ARTICLE 19, GERMANY: THE ACT TO IMPROVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW IN
SOCIAL NETWORKS (2017), https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/170901-LegalAnalysis-German-NetzDG-Act.pdf (“[T]he Act expands the list of grounds on which law enforcement
can request users inventory data from ‘service providers.’ This new ground includes inventory data
‘necessary for the enforcement of civil law claims arising from the violation of absolutely protected
rights by unlawful content as defined in the Network Enforcement Act.’”); see also MATTHIAS C.
KETTEMANN, FOLLOW-UP TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY ON “BLOCKING, FILTERING AND
TAKEDOWN OF ILLEGAL INTERNET CONTENT” (2019), https://rm.coe.int/dgi-2019-update-chaptergermany-study-on-blocking-and-filtering/168097ac51.
125. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, at 5, U.N. Doc. OL/DEU/1/2017 (June 1, 2017).
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Special Rapporteur stated that this could “undermine the right individuals enjoy to
anonymous expression,” and these
restrictions on anonymity, in particular absent judicial oversight, facilitate
State surveillance by simplifying the identification of individuals accessing
or disseminating prohibited content. By requiring complaints and
measures to be documented and stored for an undisclosed amount of time,
without providing further protection mechanisms against the misuse of
such data, individuals become more vulnerable to State surveillance. These
provisions also allow for the collection and compilation of large amounts
of data by the private sector, and place a significant burden and
responsibility on corporate actors to protect the privacy and security of
such data.126
Second, the Special Rapporteur was concerned with the
possibility that users claiming a violation would be entitled to be given
access to subscriber data without prior court approval. The protection of
anonymity, including protection against unlawful and arbitrary interference
by state or non-state actors, plays a critical role in securing the right to
freedom of opinion and expression. The absence of a judicial warrant for
the disclosure of individual information would represent a restriction that
is neither targeted nor protecting of due process rights, and it would
therefore not meet the strict test required for restrictions on privacy and
expression.127
The German government responded that the Rapporteur’s “concerns of
providing access to subscriber data without prior court approval have been met by
introducing the requirement of a court decision prior to surrendering personal
data.”128 Yet, in 2020, the German government made further amendments to the
NetzDG Act by passing a law intended to combat right-wing extremism. This law
requires that platforms send suspected criminal content directly to the federal police
at the time it is reported by a user.129
Similarly, in France, there has been movement toward increased access to
user data. In 2019, the French government announced that for the first time ever,
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Letter from the Federal Government of Germany to the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, supra note 119, at 2.
129. See DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, GESETZ GEGEN RECHTSEXTREMISMUS UND
HASSKRIMINALITÄT BESCHLOSSEN [Law Against Right-Wing Extremism and Hate Crime Passed]
(June 18, 2020) (Ger.), https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2020/kw25-de-rechtsextre
mismus-701104; Philipp Grüll, German Online Hate Speech Reform Criticised for Allowing ‘Backdoor’ Data
Collection, EURACTIV (June 19, 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/data-protection/news/
german-online-hate-speech-reform-criticised-for-allowing-backdoor-data-collection; Natasha Lomas,
Germany Tightens Hate Speech Rules to Make Platforms Send Reports Straight to the Feds, TECHCRUNCH (June
19, 2020, 7:02 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/19/germany-tightens-online-hate-speech-rules
-to-make-platforms-send-reports-straight-to-the-feds.
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Facebook had agreed to hand over identification data of French users suspected of
posting hate speech on its platform to judges.130 Previously, Facebook had only
cooperated on matters related to terrorism and violent acts by transferring the IP
addresses and other identification data of suspected individuals to French judges.
Notably, in relation to the 2018 Law on Combatting the Manipulation of
Information, the UN Special Rapporteur raised concerns that the “cooperation
mechanism established under Article 9 authorizes the Government to access the
data of subscribers, related to the reported content, without prior court
approval.”131 In particular, the “absence of a judicial authorization for the disclosure
of personal information would be a restriction which is neither targeted nor
protective of rights to a fair hearing and would therefore not meet the strict test for
imposing restrictions on privacy and freedom of expression.”132
Further, the French media regulator, Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA),
adopted recommendations in 2019 under the 2018 Law on Combatting the
Manipulation of Information, which “encourages” platforms to set up “appropriate
procedures allowing for the detection of accounts disseminating false information
on a massive scale.”133 The CSA also expressly states that it reserves the “ability [to]
request[] any information should it observe a manipulation of information or an
attempt to manipulate information likely to disturb public order or to affect the
sincerity of an election.”134
Outside of Europe, governments are going much further. Brazil’s draft Fake
News Law mandates that platforms maintain records of forwarded messages for a
period of four months, which may be requested under a court order.135

130. See Mathieu Rosemain, In a World First, Facebook to Give Data on Hate Speech Suspects to French
Courts, REUTERS (June 25, 2019, 7:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-tech-exclusive
/exclusive-in-a-world-first-facebook-to-give-data-on-hate-speech-suspects-to-french-courts-idUSKC
N1TQ1TJ.
131. David Kaye (Rapporteur spécial sur la promotion et la protection du droit à la liberté
d'opinion et d'expression), Mandat du Rapporteur spécial sur la promotion et la protection du droit à la liberté
d'opinion et d'expression [U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion,
and Expression], U.N. Doc. OL/FRA 5/2018, at 7 (May 28, 2018).
132. Id.
133. CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L’AUDIOVISUEL, RECOMMENDATION NO. 2019-03 OF 15 MAY
2019 OF THE CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L’AUDIOVISUEL TO ONLINE PLATFORM OPERATORS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE DUTY TO COOPERATE TO FIGHT THE DISSEMINATION OF FALSE INFORMATION,
at § 4(a) (Fr.), http://www.csa.fr/content/download/254203/733091/version/1/file/CSA%20-%20P
rojet%20de%20recommandation%20aux%20op%C3%A9rateurs%202504_eng-GB.pdf.
134. Id.
135. See Brazil: Reject “Fake News” Bill - Current Draft Violates Free Speech and Association, Privacy,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 24, 2020, 10:31 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/24/brazil-rejectfake-news-bill; Katitza Rodriguez & Seth Schoen, 5 Serious Flaws in the New Brazilian “Fake News” Bill
That Will Undermine Human Rights, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 29, 2020), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2020/06/5-serious-flaws-new-brazilian-fake-news-bill-will-undermin e-human-rights.
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C. The Use of Data Protection Law as a Shield by Platforms
While platforms are cooperating with governments in various initiatives to
remove illegal and harmful content such as disinformation, platforms are
simultaneously invoking data protection law concerns in response to recent efforts
to increase transparency with respect to the function and impact of their systems.
As mentioned above, access to platform data is widely considered a key mechanism
in understanding the problems of disinformation, designing policy responses, and
assessing platform responses. However, platforms have strong incentives, apart
from data protection law, to keep their systems closed, including to maintain their
dominant position in the market, where data are highly valuable.136 As Inge Graef,
Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas, and Peggy Valcke argue, maintaining concentration and
lack of access to data creates barriers for competitors and new entrants.137
There is tension in the EU Code of Practice on disinformation regarding
access to data. The Code contains, as mentioned earlier, a pillar on platforms
providing privacy-compliant access to data for research activities and for platforms
to “cooperate by providing relevant data on the functioning of their services
including data for independent investigation by academic researchers and general
information on algorithms.”138 However, there has been a tension between the
expectation under the Code for the facilitation of access to data and how it has
played out in practice. Following its first year of operation, the European
Commission commented that the provision of data to the research community was
“episodic and arbitrary” and noted that platforms “generally cite alleged risks of
data protection violations as inhibiting cooperation with the research
community.”139 Similarly, in platform submissions on the operation of the Code,
platforms such as Facebook admitted that “many stakeholders are eager for data to
be made available as quickly as possible,” while adding that it was “committed to
taking the time necessary to incorporate the highest privacy protections and
building a data infrastructure that provides data in a secure manner.”140
As such, there is growing frustration in European policy circles over the
(strategic) attempts to leverage vague data protection law concerns. ERGA’s report
on the operation of the Code’s data-access provision “show[s] clearly that the
platforms provided very little (if any) access to data for independent

136. See Inge Graef, Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas & Peggy Valcke, Assessing Data Access Issues in
Online Platforms, 39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 375 (2015).
137. Id. at 385.
138. EU CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 27, § II.E.
139. See Eur. Comm’n, Code of Practice on Disinformation: First Annual Reports, at 12 (Oct. 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62698.
140. See Facebook Report on the Implementation of the Code of Practice for Disinformation, § 5.1, (Sept.
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=62681.
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investigation.”141 Platforms argue “that they cannot provide free[] access to data
because of privacy and data security reasons, but these reasons are not fully
convincing.”142 This skepticism of the data-protection justifications put forward by
platforms led ERGA to call upon platforms to “provide formal analyses identifying
their specific concerns regarding data sharing for independent academic research
under” the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).143 ERGA hoped that
such analyses would provide a “starting point for resolving areas of ambiguity and
uncertainty.”144 ERGA also called on data protection authorities to “offer formal
guidance on permissible data sharing practices under GDPR.”145 Scholars are also
skeptical of the data protection concerns put forward by platforms and in response
are providing models for access to data based on the relevant experience of other
sectors, such as health-data research.146
The proposed Digital Services Act on reforming the EU’s rules in relation to
platforms contains substantive new rules on access to data.147 An important part of
the proposed legislation is the creation of new dedicated regulatory bodies, which
would be empowered to access data from large online platforms and to gain insights
into their business practices and the impact on users. Indeed, large platforms would
also be obliged to provide data access to certain “vetted researchers” in order to
conduct research that “contributes to the identification and understanding of
systemic risks” associated with platforms,148 including intentional manipulation of
platforms’ services and the inauthentic use or automated exploitation of their
services.149
III.

DATA PROTECTION LAW AS A STRUCTURAL SAFEGUARD

In the previous two Parts, we reviewed the various ways in which
disinformation policy can be a threat to the fundamental rights to privacy and
freedom of expression. At the same time, privacy law and, in particular, data
protection law currently provide the main systemic regulatory safeguards in Europe
in relation to disinformation. However, before expanding upon the structural
141. ERGA Report on Disinformation: Assessment of the Implementation of the Code of Practice, at 49
(2020), https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ERGA-2019-report-published-2020-L
Q.pdf.
142. Id. at 40.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See JEF AUSLOOS, PADDY LEERSSEN & PIM TEN THIJE, OPERATIONALIZING RESEARCH
ACCESS IN PLATFORM GOVERNANCE: WHAT TO LEARN FROM OTHER INDUSTRIES? (2020),
https://algorithmwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/GoverningPlatforms_IViR_study_June2
020-AlgorithmWatch-2020-06-24.pdf.
147. Regulation of the European Parliament an of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital
Services Act) and Amending Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 30, at 63–63.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 59–60.
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safeguards provided by data protection law, many other structural safeguards for
guaranteeing a pluralistic public debate and media environment existed in Europe,
particularly around guaranteeing pluralism of viewpoints during election-time. Most
EU member states still heavily regulate broadcast media by imposing many rules on
broadcaster (both public and private) impartiality, fairness, and accuracy.150 During
election-time, many EU member states prohibit paid-for political advertising on
television. In countries such as Italy, a specific election law (“Par Condicio” Law)
regulates election-time political communication across the press, broadcast, and
online, with rules on media coverage of candidates, politicians, and political parties
to ensure fairness and equal coverage.151 Further, EU member states regulate media
reporting of opinion polls, exit polls, election debates, and impose silence periods
in the run-up to polling day. Indeed, these rules came into play during the 2017
French presidential election: just as the silence period was coming into effect, nine
gigabytes of presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron’s confidential campaign
documentation were published online. However, the French Presidential Election
Commission (CNCCEP) issued a strongly worded statement on the eve of the
election, urging both traditional media and online media to refrain from reporting
on the content of the leaks. Indeed, French media generally heeded the call152 in the
interests of ensuring free expression of the opinion of the people and the “sincerity
of the vote.”153
In addition to the aforementioned structural framework, data protection law
also protects online users’ autonomy in relation to data-driven campaigns. Data
protection law requires transparency for internet audiences about targeting and
offers data subject rights in relation to audience platforms, such as social media
companies that monetize social services in ways that create new avenues for
audience targeting.
It’s on this last aspect—the way that communications end up being
disseminated on social media and other channels—that EU data protection law has
the most potential. EU data protection law applies to the processing of personal
data, which are defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable
individual (natural person). This law requires transparency and a lawful basis such
as consent. It also grants rights to access, correction, and deletion for data subjects,
150. See Anette Alén-Savikko, Ernesto Apa, Marco Bassini, Francisco Javier Cabrera Blázquez,
Ingrid Cunningham, Christina Etteldorf, Agnès Granchet, Beata Klimkiewicz, Ronan Ó Fathaigh, Juraj
Polák, Tony Prosser, Andrei Richter & Nathalie Rodriguez, MEDIA REPORTING: FACTS, NOTHING
BUT FACTS? (2018).
151. See ERNESTO APA & MARCO BASSINI , Italy, in MEDIA COVERAGE OF ELECTIONS: THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN EUROPE (2017).
152. Rachel Donaldio, Why the Macron Hacking Attack Landed With a Thud in France, N.Y. TIMES
(May 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/world/europe/macron-hacking-attack-france.
html.
153. Commission Nationale de Contrôle de la Campagne électorale en vue de l’Élection
Présidentielle, Recommandation aux médias suite à l'attaque informatique dont a été victime l'équipe de campagne de
M. Macron [Recommendation to the Media Following the Computer Attack Against Mr. Macron’s Campaign Team]
(May 6, 2017), http://www.cnccep.fr/communiques/cp14.html.
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all of which are subject to independent regulatory oversight. As personal data are
likely to be a key ingredient to disinformation campaigns and strategies, data
protection law will apply to the actors who are steering the messaging and
campaigns, as well as the services, such as social media platforms, that provide a
platform for data-driven communications. By putting a check on what is happening
with personal data in the online domain, data protection law has the potential, at
least in theory, to be an important safeguard.
Areas in which data protection law and disinformation have intersected for
quite some time are the use of personal data, predictive analytics, and behavioral
targeting in elections. As the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) puts it in
its recent guidance on elections, “Compliance with data protection rules, including
in the context of electoral activities and political campaigns, is essential to protect
democracy.”154 The EDPB notes that for targeted messaging “adequate
information should be provided to voters explaining why they are receiving a
particular message, who is responsible for it and how they can exercise their rights
as data subjects.”155 It further notes the fact that voter data and personal data that
reveal political opinions is considered a “special category” of data, which will
generally require the explicit consent of the individual to be used by third parties.156
It clarifies that personal data that has been made public, such as the information on
someone’s social media profile, falls within the scope of the regulation and cannot
be collected and processed without constraints. Finally, the guidance also highlights
the special protections of people against profiling and automated decision-making.
In this context, it notes that “profiling connected to targeted campaign messaging
may in certain circumstances cause ‘similarly significant effects’ and shall in
principle only be lawful with the valid explicit consent of the data subject.”157
The most thorough guidance on the topic was released by the European Data
Protection Supervisor in its Opinion on online manipulation and personal data.158 The
Opinion covers a broad range of concerns around online manipulation (and the
data-driven strategies underpinning new forms of manipulation). Notably, the
context of disinformation and related strategies are of central concern to the EDPS.
The EDPS considers online manipulation to be a symptom of a broader lack of
accountability in the digital ecosystem. It calls for robust enforcement of existing
data protection rules, together with other norms on elections and media pluralism
154. European Data Protection Board Statement 2/2019, Statement on the Use of Personal
Data in the Course of Political Campaigns (Mar. 13, 2019), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/fil
es/file1/edpb-2019-03-13-statement-on-elections_en.pdf.
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisoron Online Manipulation and Personal Data,
Opinion 3/2018 (Mar. 19, 2018), https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_onlin
e_manipulation_en.pdf.
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in view of the threats to fundamental rights and the functioning of democracy. The
European Commission notes in its recent evaluation of the GDPR, “protecting
personal data is . . . instrumental in preventing the manipulation of citizens’ choices,
in particular via the micro-targeting of voters based on the unlawful processing of
personal data, avoiding interference in democratic processes and preserving the
open debate, the fairness and the transparency that are essential in a democracy.”159
As pointed out by others, disinformation campaigns may involve the profiling
of audiences with regard to their susceptibility to being misled by certain
communications.160 In other words, whereas a certain susceptibility with respect to
disinformation may exist, it’s the data-driven profiling and targeting that creates
significant additional challenges. While some have proposed curtailment of the
granularity of targeting possibilities in the context of political messaging, perhaps a
similar result could be reached through strict enforcement of data protection rules
with respect to political campaigns in Europe.
CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the problematic aspects of European
disinformation policy, particularly relating to overbroad content-based restrictions,
law enforcement involvement, and increased monitoring of the online environment.
However, another important strand of European disinformation policy is being
developed under the European Democracy Action Plan adopted in late 2020.161
Crucially, the Democracy Action Plan, as distinct from upcoming regulation of
online platforms under the DSA, seeks to tackle disinformation through measures
such as funding projects to support deliberative democratic infrastructures,
strengthening media freedom and media pluralism, and strengthening
empowerment of citizens to make informed decisions through strengthening media
literacy.162 This framework is consistent with the ECtHR’s holding that states not
only have a negative duty of non-interference with freedom of expression, but also
have a “positive obligation” to put in place an appropriate legislative and
administrative framework to guarantee effective pluralism163 and “create a
favourable environment for participation in public debate by all the persons

159. Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Data Protection as a Pillar
of Citizens’ Empowerment and the EU’s Approach to the Digital Transition - Two Years of Application of the General
Data Protection Regulation, at 4, COM (2020) 264 final (June 24, 2020).
160. See Karen Kornbluh, Could Europe’s New Data Protection Regulation Curb Online Disinformation?,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/could-europes-newdata-protection-regulation-curb-online-disinformation.
161. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – On the European Democracy Action Plan, supra note 8.
162. Id. at 9, 11, 24. European Democracy Action Plan - Roadmap, Ref. Ares (2020)3624828
(July 9, 2020).
163. Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. v. Italy, App. No. 38433/09, 2012-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 267, 310 (2012).
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concerned.”164 The Democracy Action Plan would align with international freedom
of expression standards, which emphasize that a key means of addressing
disinformation is for states to promote a free, independent, and diverse
communications environment, including media diversity.165

164. Huseynova v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 10653/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2017).
165. Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda, supra
note 95, at § 3(a).

